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his paper presents a new routing protocol called Secure and Energy Aware Routing Protocol (ETARP) designed for energy
eiciency and security for wireless sensor networks (WSNs). ETARP attempts to deal with WSN applications operating in extreme
environments such as the battleield. he key part of the routing protocol is route selection based on utility theory. he concept of
utility is a novel approach to simultaneously factor energy eiciency and trustworthiness of routes in the routing protocol. ETARP
discovers and selects routes on the basis of maximum utility with incurring additional cost in overhead compared to the common
AODV(AdHocOnDemandDistanceVector) routing protocol. Simulation results show that, in comparison to previously proposed
routing protocols, namely, AODV-EHA and LTB-AODV (Light-Weight Trust-Based Routing Protocol), the proposed ETARP can
keep the same security level while achieving more energy eiciency for data packet delivery.
1. Introduction
Ad hoc networks are self-coniguring wireless networks of
mobile devices without a ixed infrastructure, and wireless
sensor networks (WSNs) are a type of ad hoc networks
consisting of wirelessly interconnected sensor nodes. Sensor
nodes may have functions including sensing, data relaying,
and data exchanging with other networks outside the WSN
[1]. WSNs may range in size from a few to hundreds of
thousands of nodes.
While WSNs are useful for a wide variety of applica-
tions, this paper is focused on applications operating in
extreme environments such as the battleield where the risk
of harm prohibits any manual engineering work. Various
WSN applications can be deployed in the battleield. For
soldier detection and tracking (SDT), unattended acoustic
and seismic sensors are deployed at speciic points to detect
the approach of enemy soldiers in order to protect military
sites or buildings [2]. Sensors can detect typical sounds made
by soldier activities, for example, walking, crawling, weapon
handling, and talking, at a distance. Another example of
interest here is littoral antisubmarine warfare (ASW) that
utilizes small and low cost sensors equipped with passive
or active sonar, which can be deployed in large numbers
(hundreds or thousands) to provide a high density sensor
ield to detect enemy submarines [3]. hese sensors have a
short detection range and are far less susceptible to multipath
reverberations and other acoustic artifacts.
here aremany otherWSN applications that share certain
features with these two examples. First, nodes are usually
deployed without careful preplanning (e.g., airdrop deploy-
ment) since the battleield is a dangerous zone, and sending
engineers to carry out precise deployment is not preferable.
hus network topology is not known a priori and will likely
change over time due to exterior forces (e.g., explosions and
movements). he networks are ad hoc by necessity in these
environments.
Second, the nodes in the applications of interest are
otenphysically unreachable ater deployment. Consequently,
replacement of the energy source (typically battery) is dii-
cult or impossible. In order for the network to operate as long
as possible, nodes may be capable of harvesting energy, and
network routing protocols should select routes to minimize
energy cost.
hird, the network faces the risk of attacks to interfere
with operations, such as selective forwarding, wormhole
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attacks, sinkhole attacks, and Sybil attacks [4]. Nodes may
become compromised which could be very diicult to detect.
It is commonly assumed that compromised nodes may
exhibit suspicious behavior, which is monitored and factored
into a reputation system that calculates a reputation for every
node and adapts route selections to avoid nodes with low
reputations. Moreover, suspected nodes are prevented from
participating in the routing protocol.
While routing protocols have been proposed for energy
eiciency or security separately, the new routing protocol
proposed here balances the two objectives simultaneously
by means of utility theory. To the best of our knowledge,
this is an original approach for WSN routing protocols. An
essential component of the routing protocol is a new method
to estimate energy consumption for packet forwarding.
Another essential element is a Bayesian network to judge the
probability of each node being compromised (or introduce a
reputation or trust).
he contributions of this paper are as follows. First, a
novel energy eicient routing protocol is proposed which
aims to minimize energy consumption for data transmission.
he second contribution is the novel use of utility theory to
simultaneously consider two factors: energy eiciency and
trustworthiness of nodes. hird, a Bayesian network is used
to estimate the trustworthiness of nodes which is a diferent
approach from previous literature.
Section 2 is a review of related work. In Section 3, the
central concepts in the new Energy Eicient Trust-Aware
Routing Protocol (ETARP) are presented. he methods to
estimate energy consumption and risk of node compromise
are explained. Performance evaluation in terms of simulation
results is presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2. Related Work
Many routing protocols have been proposed for WSNs; for
instance, see a good survey by Royer and Toh [5]. hese
traditional routing options forWSNs include the data centric
approach such as Directed Difusion and reactive approach
such as Dynamic Source Routing (DSR). Particularly, a
reactive approach called Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance
Vector (AODV) routing has been a popular candidate due to
advantages in coping with the ad hoc nature of some WSNs
as AODV does not require knowledge of the global network
topology.
Some eforts have been made to improve the energy ei-
ciency of the routing protocol itself. For example, the routing
method described in [6] attempted to minimize the energy
consumed for routing data packets, but the drawback is that
location information is required. In [7], the author provides
a simple, scalable, and eicient solution for minimum cost
routing in WSNs. In fact, the term “minimum cost” refers to
maximum network lifetime, achieved by choosing the route
with maximum energy reserve which is not exactly the same
as a route with minimum energy cost. Another approach
of minimum cost message delivery was studied in [8]. his
approach sought the minimum cost path from any given
source to a speciic sink in sensor networks. his approach
may not be suitable for some WSN applications because the
sink (or destination node) is assumed to be ixed.
2.1. Energy Harvesting Aware Routing Protocols. Another
research direction considers renewable energy from an exter-
nal energy source. Renewable energy can be harvested from
the surrounding environment by variousmeans such as solar,
wind, thermal, or motion [9]. Solar power is well suited to
WSNs because not only sunlight is easy to access but also solar
panels can be made small enough to be mounted on wireless
sensor nodes.
A notable routing algorithm that is energy harvesting
aware is the Distributed Energy Harvesting Aware Routing
Algorithm (DEHAR) [10], which deines a new metric of
“energy distance” (including energy harvesting) for selecting
the best route. By this metric, DEHAR aims to ind the
route withminimum total energy distance rather than spatial
distance. But DEHAR calculates the shortest energy distance
by using a method such as directed difusion, a looding
mechanism incurring extra routing overhead. In contrast,
ETARP proposed here avoids extra overhead in route discov-
ery (compared to AODV). OR-AHaD (Opportunistic Rout-
ing algorithmwithAdaptiveHarvesting-awareDuty Cycling)
proposed in [11] is designed with energy management capa-
bilities that consider variations in the availability of the
environmental energy. OR-AHaD can adjust the duty cycle of
each node adaptively in order to exploit the available energy
resources eiciently in comparison to other opportunistic
routing protocols. But geographical information is required,
which is not well suited to the applications of interest here.
2.2. Secure Routing Protocols. Security challenges in WSNs
are similar to those in mobile ad hoc networks identiied
in [12, 13], and some existing routing protocols such as
TinySec [14], Spins [15], TinyPK [16], and TinyECC [17]
attempt to eliminate unauthorized behavior of malicious
sensor nodes with the help of encryption or authentication
on data packets. However, these solutions may be diicult for
WSNs. For instance, data encryption is applicable for mobile
ad hoc networks but generally not practical forWSNs because
sensors have limited data processing capabilities and energy
storage.
In addition to cryptographic solutions, routing algo-
rithms that employ notions of trust and reputation have been
proposed, such as trust-based on-demand multipath routing
(AOTDV) [18] and light-weight trust-based routing pro-
tocol (LTB-AODV) [19]. hey passively observe forwarded
data traic and then calculate the risk level of diferent
routes in terms of “trust values.” he routing algorithm then
chooses the most trusted route. Compared to ETARP, the
reputation system used in AOTDV or LTB-AODV watches
for a single speciic behavior only, not like the Bayesian
network adopted in ETARP. ETARP monitors multiple node
behaviors and makes comprehensive judgments on node
status. Furthermore, AOTDV or LTB-AODV focuses only on
security with no special attention given to energy eiciency
concerns.
Journal of Sensors 3
2.3. Routing Protocols including Energy Harvesting and Secu-
rity. here are a few papers starting to consider security
and energy eiciency at the same time. For instance, Ferng
and Rachmarini [20] proposed a secure routing protocol
for WSNs considering energy eiciency, but compared to
ETARP, it has a disadvantage requiring information about
node locations to improve energy eiciency. Furthermore, it
depends on encryption which can be a heavy computation
cost for sensor nodes. LS-LEACH [21] is another energy
aware routing protocol, based on the LEACH (Low-Energy
Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy) protocol, that depends on
cryptographic authentication. he scheme generates extra
overhead compared to ETARP.
3. ETARP Routing
his section describes the ETARP routing protocol designed
for theWSN applicationsmentioned in Section 1.he routing
protocol aims to simultaneously consider energy eiciency
and security to avoid routes that are ineicient and risky. In
order to simplify the description, we assume for the moment
a “normal” condition absent of attacks in the network. In this
case, ETARP works to discover and select the most energy
eicient routes. In the next section, attacks on the network
will be taken into account to show how ETARP factors
trustworthiness of nodes into the route selection. Because
energy eiciency and security are two diferent problems,
ETARP takes a novel approach of factoring both using the
notion of expected utility.
A basic example to demonstrate the idea of ETARP is
shown in Figure 1. Ater the enemy appears in the WSN
covered region, their activity can be detected by a nearby
sensor node (e.g., acoustic or seismic sensor) which will
send warning information back to the data collection point.
Usually this process cannot be accomplished in a single
hop transmission; ETARP serves to ind the most energy
eicient multihop route while simultaneously avoiding any
(perceived) compromised nodes. he status of nodes is
estimated by a Bayesian network that collects data about
observed node behaviors and calculates the probability that
each node is compromised or not.
3.1. Energy Eiciency Routing in Absence of Attacks. For the
moment, attacks on the network are ignored to present
how ETARP operates to discover and select energy eicient
routes. Previous studies have found that the ad hoc nature
of the network dictates an on-demand routing protocol such
as AODV. However, AODV aims to minimize hop count
without consideration of energy costs. ETARP is based on
AODV but adds awareness of transmission energy costs.
he route discovery by ETARP operates similarly to
AODV except for a diferent format of the routing messages:
route requests (RREQs), route replies (RREPs), and so on.
he format of the RREQ message in the original AODV is
shown in Table 1 [22]. In ETARP, the ield “hop count” is
replaced with “energy count.” “Energy count” here implies
the prediction of average transmission energy to successfully
deliver a data packet from the originator node to the node
Node’s status
determined by Bayesian
network
Enemy
intrusion
detected
Source
node
Compromised
node
Normal
sensor
node
Data
collecting
point with
mobility
Sensor
with
energy
harvesting
Other choices of route
Optimal route determined by ETARP
Enemy intrusion detection
on battleeld
Figure 1: Example of WSN application scenario.
Table 1: RREQ message format in original AODV.
Type R A Reserved Preix Sz Hop count
Destination IP address
Destination sequence number
Originator IP address
Lifetime
handling the request. he predictions are deined in (1)–(5)
later in this section.
he same change applies to the RREP message as well.
he ield “hop count” in the original AODVRREPmessage is
replaced with “energy count” in the ETARP RREP message.
Again “energy count” refers to the predicted average trans-
mission cost to successfully deliver a data packet from the
originator node to the destination node.
Since ETARPuses the same basicmessages (RREQ,RREP,
etc.) as AODV, it does not incur more overhead compared to
the original AODV.he next question is how to deine energy
consumption.
On any chosen �th routewith total number of �� nodes, the
expected total transmission cost �� in terms of energy can be
calculated as
�� = ��1 + ��2 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ��(��−1), (1)
where ��� is the estimated transmission cost from the �th
node on this route to its next hop (1 ≤ � ≤ �� − 1).
Transmission cost depends on successful delivery of a
packet possibly ater a number of reattempts. To be more
speciic, transmission cost has the form
��� = ��� (��� + �� + ��) �, (2)
where ��� is the predicted average number of retries ater a
packet is successfully transmitted fromnode� to its next hop
node�+ 1; ��� is the minimum required radio transmission
power level at node� to successfully deliver a data packet to
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the next hop;�� is the processing power at node� (consumed
by circuits for the preparation of radio transmission including
coding andmodulation);�� is the receiving power at next hop� + 1 (consumed for receiving data including demodulation
and decoding); and � is the transmission time needed for
each transmission attempt.
At least some of the nodes are assumed to be capable of
harvesting solar energy. he harvested energy is considered
free and accounted in ��� as
��� = ��� (��� + �� + �� − ����)�, (3)
where � is the maximum output power of the photovoltaic
power generator and ��� is a random number in the range[0, 1] if node � is capable of energy harvesting or ��� = 0 if
node � is not capable of energy harvesting. As mentioned
in Section 1, solar cells are more suitable to be mounted
on sensor nodes considering the size (e.g., wind driven
generator is too bulky) or energy source accessibility (e.g.,
motion power is hard to access since nodes operate in severe
environment where human activity is rare).
For nodes with energy harvesting, ��� = ��/� where ��
is the active power level of the photovoltaic power generator.
For a photovoltaic power generator [23], its active power is
assumed to follow a �-distribution given by the probability
density function:
� (��) = Γ (� + �)Γ (�) Γ (�) (
��
� )
�−1
(1 − ��� )
�−1
, (4)
where � and � are the shape parameters of the distribution
and Γ is the gamma function. Beta distributions are it to
the past record of sunlight data using the algorithm that
minimizes the KS statistic [24], and its shape parameters� and � depend on the speciic geographic location where
sunlight data are recorded. his assumption is also based
on the past recorded sunlight data and statistical correlation
analysis of solar radiance and consumer load.
In order to successfully transmit a packet from node �
to the next node, the expected average number of retries���
can be calculated as
��� = 11 − ��� , (5)
where ��� is the probability of the packet not being delivered
(or outage probability) from node � to node � + 1 on any
attempt [25]. Previous studies have shown that ��� can be
expressed as a function of ��� [26].
Ater ETARP discovers a number of possible routes, say
with energy costs {�1, �2, . . . , ��}, it selects the route with the
minimum energy cost.
3.2. Energy Eicient and Secure Routing in Presence of Attacks.
he previous section dealt with the simple case of energy
eicient routing assuming normal conditions without attacks
on the network.he possibility of attacks adds complications
because nodes can become compromised and interfere with
packet forwarding.
Our approach to add security awareness into ETARP
relies on the concept of “expected utility” from utility theory.
Either transmission energy or risk of untrusted nodes will
diminish the expected utility of a route. ETARP seeks routes
with high expected utility which will be both energy eicient
and trusted.
In practical operation, ETARP requires changes in the
format of control messages described earlier in Section 3.1.
For instance, the “energy count” ield in RREQ messages is
replaced with “expected utility count” which here means the
expected utility of the route from the originator node to the
node handling the request. Similarly for the RREP message,
the ield “energy count” is replaced with “expected utility
count” where expected utility count refers to the expected
utility of the route from the originator node to the destination
node.
3.2.1. Deinition of Utility. Utility is a quite general concept
known frommicroeconomics. In economics, utility is used to
relect a level of satisfaction of consumerswhen they purchase
goods from a market. Usually the diiculty is how to exactly
measure utility. Modern deinitions of utility intend it to
qualitatively relect “consumer preferences”.he goal is not to
determine the exact value of utility, which is problematic, but
to determinewhether a choice of a particular good or product
has a higher utility compared to others [27].
In WSNs, the utility or preference designated for a
route is related to both energy cost and security level
(trustworthiness). Consider a speciic route consisting of� nodes (� − 1 hops). Considering only energy on any
speciic hop, say the�th hop, the utility function is inversely
proportional to the predicted transmission cost on this hop.
Less energy consumption means a longer lifetime that is
more “preferable” for the sensor nodes and therefore a higher
utility. hen the utility function of the �th hop, denoted by��, satisies �� ∝ 1/��, where �� is the estimation of
transmission cost from the�th node on this route to its next
hop (1 ≤ � ≤ � − 1).
he transmission on each hop takes place successively
over time, starting from the source node and ending at the
destination node. he utility of all these hops is imperfect
substitutes to each other, meaning that some reduction in
utility of �th hop might be compensated for to some extent
by the addition in another hop’s utility and vice versa. But
this is not always the case; for example, if the �th hop is a
dead link, no matter how good condition the other hops are,
this route is considered to be useless with zero total utility.
Due to this imperfect substitutes property, the utility function
of a speciic route belongs to the Cobb-Douglas type with
standard form of � = ������ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , where ��, ��, ��, . . . . . .
denote the utility generated from irst, second, third, . . . . . .
until the last (� − 1th) hop on a route, respectively. hat
is, the utility of a route is the product of utility on all the�−1 hops [27]. On the other hand, wireless sensors deployed
in a speciic network typically belong to the same type with
identical technical speciications; thus the sender nodes at
each hop can be considered to be identical and use the same
utility function to describe their “preference.” In this case,
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the multiple � − 1 hops transmission on this route can
be considered equivalent to a node repeating a single hop
transmission�− 1 times. hen the total utility on this route
can be written as
�route =
�−1∏
�=1
�� =
�−1∏
�=1
( 1��)
� , (6)
where � is a positive constant indicating the “preference” level
of each hop, which is related to the sensitivity to energy cost.
Note that the numerator in the last part in (6) corresponds
to the energy consumption factor on each hop, which is
already explained in (3) of Section 3.1.
3.2.2. Calculation of Expected Utility. At each hop, there is
a certain risk that the next node is compromised. In other
words, there is never certainty about the status of any node
(malicious or not). Given this uncertainty, we introduce the
weighted average of utilities gained from all the possible
results (malicious node or not) as the “expected utility” ���:
��� = (�� + (1 − ��) ��) �� + (1 − ��) (1 − ��) 0
= (�� + (1 − ��) ��) ��,
(7)
where �� is the probability that the destination node is
safe (not compromised) and �� is the possibility that the
destination node is compromised but pretends to behave like
normal node (a so-called “grey hole”). How to determine
the probability �� is explained in Section 3.3. If the node
is safe or pretending to be normal, the utility of this hop
is ��. Otherwise the node is considered compromised with
zero utilities. he total expected utility on the entire route is
given by ��route = ∏�−1�=1 ���. As mentioned earlier, utility is
only useful for acting as an indicator of preference between
diferent choices of routes, and the precise utility value does
not have any practical meaning.
ETARP discovers a number of possible routes, along
with their expected total utility. It selects the route with the
maximum total utility as the best route.
3.3. Estimation of Risk by Bayesian Network. Generally, it
is diicult to ascertain whether a node has been actually
compromised or not unless it is manifested in the node’s
observable behavior. A practical approach assumes that a risk
can be estimated by observing the node’s behavior compared
to its expected behavior. In order to calculate a “belief ” about
a node’s trustworthiness, a learning Bayesian network is pro-
posed for this purpose. As addressed in Section 2, unlike the
reputation management employed by previously proposed
AOTDVor LTB-AODVwhich only watch a speciic behavior,
a Bayesian network ismeant to organize the entire knowledge
about observed node behavior into a coherent whole and
makes comprehensive judgments on node status. Perhaps
the use of joint probability distribution could be another
approach to deal with multiple types of nodes behaviors,
but the size of a joint probability distribution would be
exponential in the number of nodes behaviors of interest,
increasing both modeling and computational diiculties. On
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Figure 2: General Bayesian network structure.
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Figure 3: A Bayesian network example.
the other hand, a Bayesian network can address all of these
diiculties in principle, by acting as a graphical modeling tool
for specifying probability distributions [28].
To be more speciic, a Bayesian network is a probabilistic
graphical model that represents a set of random variables and
their conditional dependencies via a directed acyclic graph
(DAG). Our Bayesian network serves to model a set of node
status (comprised or not) and their behaviors. It can be used
to predict the most likely status of a node based on past
observed behaviors. To calculate this prediction, one method
is the maximum likelihood approach.
A general Bayesian network structure employed in our
case is shown in Figure 2. To determine whether a node is
safe (not compromised, denoted by H), we need to observe
the node’s symptoms; some symptoms may require further
observation on their subsymptoms.
Considering a basic practical example shown in Figure 3,
the purpose is to determine a node’s “health” status (node is
compromised or not), denoted by variable H, two symptoms
are considered: “node used to drop packets” (denoted by
variable D). Note that it is normal for a node to drop packet
sometimes for a valid reason, for example, bad link quality,
but the term “drop packet” here implies that the number of
dropped packets is unusually large. Also, “node participated
in routing before or not” (denoted by variable P) can help to
identify attacks including selective forwarding, sink hole, and
black and gray hole. hese variables are binary, represented
by ℎ1 (true) or ℎ2 (false) for variable H, �1 (true) or �2
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Table 2: Incomplete data setsD.
D � � �
case1 ? �2 �1
case2 ? �1 �2
case3 ? �1 �1
(false) for D, and �1 (true) or �2 (false) for P. Circles in this
DAG represent the aforementioned propositional variables.
Edges in the graph represent “direct causal inluences” among
these variables; for example, the node participated in routing
before (P) is a direct cause of node not being compromised
(H). All these causal inluences are presented by conditional
probabilities, an example shown in the last two subtables
of Table 3 (which is also an example of initial estimates to
be explained later). Given this causal structure, one would
expect the dynamics of changing belief to satisfy some
properties. For example, if we get a record that the sensor
node dropped a packet, our belief that the node participated
in routing before would probably decrease.
In practical cases, the recorded node symptoms (referred
to as data sets) are usually incomplete due to some reason;
for example, a node is compromised or not cannot be directly
observed (in fact, the purpose of creating Bayesian network
is to determine it). Table 2 shows an example of incomplete
data setsD with 3 diferent recorded data cases: case1, case2,
and case3. A data case is a record of a set of symptoms shown
by a node, in other words, a record with certain combination
of instantiation (ℎ, �, �), in which the status parameters ℎ1,�1, and �1 denote that this node has not been compromised,
used to drop packet, and participated in routing before,
respectively. And ℎ2,�2, and�2 denote that this node has been
compromised, not used to drop packet, and not participated
in routing before, respectively. he symbol “?” represents the
missing values of variables.
he goal is to calculate the expected empirical distribu-
tion of nodes statusH based on the incomplete data set. Some
initial estimates are assumed as shown in Table 3 based on
common sense; a comprised node is more likely to drop data
packet and not participate in previous routing. On the other
hand, a compromised node is more likely to participate in
routing but may still drop data packet for some reason, for
example, data transmission error.
he expected empirical distribution of the incomplete
data setD is deined as
�D (�) def= 1� ∑case�,c�=�� (c� | case�) , (8)
where � is an event with certain combination of instantiation(ℎ, �, �),� is the size of the data set, and c� are variables with
unrecorded values of case case�.
For example, the probability of an instantiation ℎ1, �2, �1
(which denotes the following: node is not compromised, node
did not use to drop packet, and node participated in routing
before) is given by
�D (ℎ1, �2, �1) = � (ℎ1 | case1)3 . (9)
Table 3: Initial estimates.
(a)
� �
D
(ℎ)
ℎ1 0.8ℎ2 0.2
(b)
� � �
D
(� | ℎ)
ℎ1 �1 0.1ℎ1 �2 0.9ℎ2 �1 0.8ℎ2 �2 0.2
(c)
� � �
D
(� | ℎ)
ℎ1 �1 0.5ℎ1 �2 0.5ℎ2 �1 0.25ℎ2 �2 0.75
Repeating this process can obtain the probability of
all the other instantiations (ℎ�, ��, ��). hen the expectation
maximization estimate of a node not being compromised is
written as
�D (ℎ1) = ∑�D (ℎ1, ��, ��) . (10)
Other parameters such as �D(� | ℎ) and �D(� | ℎ) can be
calculated by
�D (�� | ℎ�) = ∑�D (ℎ�, �� | ��)∑�D (ℎ� | ��) ,
�D (�� | ℎ�) = ∑�D (ℎ�, �� | ��)∑�D (ℎ� | ��) .
(11)
All the results derived from (8) and (11) based on
incomplete data setsD constitute theD estimates that serves
as the replacement of initial estimates shown in Table 3. If we
continue to observe the network and fetch new incomplete
data sets D1, D2, . . . ,D�, where � is a positive integer, as
proved in Chapter 17 in [28], for any�,D�+1 estimates have
a higher likelihood than that of D� estimates. hus all the
above procedures can be repeated to update theD estimates
to D1 estimates, D2 estimates, and so on, in order to get
estimates with higher likelihood.
A potential problem of the aforementioned Bayesian
network based risk determination method is that certain
suspicious node’s (or “target node”) behaviors need to be
monitored by its neighboring nodes (so called “watcher”)
while these nodes themselves might be malicious. Whether
these “watchers” are reporting honestly becomes a new issue.
How to acquire correct behavior information of the target
node under the existence of some dishonest “watchers” is
considered a classical agreement problem called Byzantine
Generals’ Problem. If � is the number of dishonest watchers
involved in the monitoring process, it has been proved that
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we can still obtain the correct information of target node if
the total number of “watchers” satisies � ≥ 3� + 1 [29].
Applying this property to our case, assume that the
entire WSN network has nodes deployment density of �
nodes/�2, the malicious fraction of the network is V, and size
of neighboring area of target node is��2; it can be concluded
that the accurate status of a target node can be obtained if the
number of watchers � involved in monitoring the target node
satisies
� ≥ 3V�� + 1, (12)
where � is clearly an integer.
4. Performance Evaluation
In this section, the safety performance and energy eiciency
performance of the ETARP routing protocol are analyzed.
Two competitors are chosen for comparison. he irst pro-
tocol is LTB-AODV, which is dedicated to the mitigation
of network attacks based on the observed past behaviors of
nodes [19]. he other protocol for comparison is AODV-
EHA which is an energy eicient protocol aware of energy
harvesting [30].
In performance evaluation, “safety performance” involves
the average number of compromised nodes that are likely
to be encountered in a single transmission, given a speciic
malicious ratio. Likewise “energy eiciency performance”
here involves the estimated energy cost ater successfully
delivering a data packet in a single transmission along the
route discovered by a speciic routing protocol.
4.1. Existing Protocols for Comparison
4.1.1. Overview of LTB-AODV to Compare Safety. In LTB-
AODV [19], diferent “trust values” are computed for all the
routes to represent the risk level; then the algorithm chooses
the route with the least hops among the candidates having a
trust value higher than a given threshold. Let��� (�)denote the
level of trust of any speciied node � on any chosen neighbor
node �. It is calculated as
��� (�) = Number of packets forwarded by �Number of packets to be forwarded by � . (13)
he values of the numerator and denominator are obtained
by node �monitoring the traic of its neighbor �.
For a complete route, the total trust value, denoted by
��route, is given as the product ��route = ∏�−1�=1���, where ��� is
the trust value of the �th node on its next hop. LTB-AODV
is a modiication of the AODV protocol incorporating the
above trust estimation technique. hus LTB-AODV chooses
the most trusted route.
4.1.2. Overview of AODV-EHA to Compare Energy Eiciency.
InAODV-EHA [30], the predictions of data transmission cost
(in terms of energy) are computed for all the routes while
considering the energy harvesting technology.he algorithm
chooses the route with the least energy cost approximation
Table 4: Simulation parameters.
Parameters Descriptions
Simulation Area 500m × 500m
Node radio range 250m
Traic type CBR
Packet size 127 bytes
Data rate 20 kbps
Signal to noise ratio (SNR)hreshold � 10
Processing power level �� 10−4 W
Receiving power level �� 5 × 10−5 W
Outage requirement �∗�� 10−4
for data transmission. Let ��(�) denote the approximation of
energy cost ater a data packet is successfully delivered from
any speciied node � to any chosen neighbor node �; then,
for a complete route, the total trust energy cost denoted by
�route is given as the sum �route = ∑�−1�=1 ��, where �� is the
estimation of energy cost ater successfully delivering a data
packet from the �th node to its next hop. AODV-EHA is a
modiication of the AODV protocol incorporating the above
energy cost estimation. hus AODV-EHA chooses the most
energy eicient route.
4.2. Simulation Setup. he experimental evaluation is carried
out bymeans ofMATLAB simulations using theMonte-Carlo
method. he two criteria considered are safety performance
and energy eiciency performance.
he size of the simulated area is 500m × 500m. he
communication range of each node is 250m. Considering the
WSN applications, this paper focuses on (as addressed in the
beginning of Section 1) IEEE 802.15.4 which was chosen for
the physical and data-link layer, which is suitable for low data
rate but very long battery life applications [31]. According to
the speciicationmentioned in [31], the traic type is constant
bit rate (CBR) with a data rate of 20Kbps, and the size of each
packet is 127 bytes. Since the transmission cost prediction
partly depends on previous works [26]; therefore, for those
parameters required for the prediction process, we continue
to use same values as adopted in [26]. Details are listed in
Table 4.
Every simulation contains a certain malicious fraction of
the network.hese compromised nodes are located randomly
in the simulation area, and they are assigned with certain
behaviors that can further afect the route discovery process.
4.3. Experimental Results. he chosen scenario is analogous
to the application of enemy detection on the battleield. he
data collection device (possibly a human) could be assigned
to any position in the area where theWSN is deployed, rather
than being tied to a ixed place. he number of nodes in the
simulated area varies from 50 to 90.
4.3.1. Safety Performance. Figure 4 shows the safety per-
formance of the 3 protocols under diferent compromised
ratios (10%–30%). It can be seen that, as the malicious ratio
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Figure 4: Average route risk level (average number of compromised
nodes encountered on the route).
increases from 10% to 30%, the diiculty of maintaining
security in the network is increasing. On the other hand,
under diferent malicious ratios, the risk level lines of ETARP
and LTB-AODV wind around each other while luctuating
a little bit as the nodes number increases. herefore we
can conclude that ETARP can maintain a similar safety
performance as LTB-AODV.
By comparison, there is a more notable increment of risk
level for AODV-EHA, as the malicious ratio increases in the
network. Under any certain malicious ratio, the risk level line
for AODV-EHA keeps increasing with the number of nodes
in the network. his is due to the network coverage area
remaining the samewhile the number of compromised nodes
increases. hus we can conclude that there is no security in
AODV-EHA, as expected, since its original design did not
take safety into consideration.
4.3.2. Energy Eiciency Performance. Figures 5–7 show the
average energy cost of each transmission under diferent
compromised ratios (10%–30%).
For any certain malicious ratio, both lines of ETARP and
LTB-AODV luctuate per number of nodes in the network.
ETARP consistently uses less average transmission cost com-
pared to LTB-AODV in terms of energy. More speciically,
the energy cost of ETARP is reduced by 2.4% to 20.5% in
comparison to that of LTB-AODV, depending on various
situations.
On the other hand, the average transmission cost of
AODV-EHA under any certain malicious ratio tends to
decrease as the nodes number increases. he cost appears to
be less than that of ETARPor LTB-AODV; but as illustrated in
Section 4.3.1, the route determined by AODV-EHA is likely
to be a dead-link almost in every transmission. A dead-
link makes the theoretical minimum energy cost of AODV-
EHA meaningless, since the packets are probably dropped
on their way without reaching destination. All the energy
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Figure 5: Average end to end transmission cost (Joule).
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Figure 6: Average end to end transmission cost (Joule).
already spent on the transmission is wasted, even though it
is ostensibly less than that of ETARP.
From all the above results gained from safety and energy
eiciency performance evaluations, we can conclude that,
under diferent compromised ratios, ETARP has advantages
in terms of energy eiciency in transmission while it can still
maintain almost the same safety performance as LTB-AODV
at the same time (stated in Section 4.3.1). By comparison,
even though AODV-EHA achieves the theoretical “lowest”
transmission cost, there is no security in AODV-EHA since
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its original design focused on reducing energy cost but did
not give attention to security.
A large network can be considered an interconnection of
many smaller ones. We believe that the current results can be
generalized to larger networks for the following reasons.
Suppose we are trying to ind an optimal route from a
speciic source to a speciic destination in a large network.he
whole optimal route could be further decomposed tomultiple
subroutes; each one traverses a smaller subnetwork. Since
these subnetworks are part of the whole network, they shall
keep some identical properties, for example, nodes density
and malicious rate. herefore, for the same routing protocol,
the subroute of the whole optimal route also serves as the
optimal route in the corresponding subnetwork. In other
words, for the same routing protocol, its routing process
in the whole network is equivalent to the repeat of routing
process in multiple subnetworks, and this protocol will not
show a diferent and surprising behavior in a large network
compared to the behavior of smaller ones.
Figure 8 shows a simple example of the aforementioned
network decomposition; the whole optimal route is divided
into 2 subroutes and transverses 2 subnetworks. he number
of subroutes and subnetworks could be extended to any
volume.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced the ETARP routing protocol for
WSNapplications operating in extreme environments usually
for military use, such as SDT and ASW. ETARP simulta-
neously considers energy eiciency and security concerns
by taking advantage of utility theory. hrough simulations,
we evaluated the energy eiciency performance and safety
performance of ETARP in comparison to LTB-AODV and
Subnetwork 1 Destination node
Subnetwork 2
Source
node
Subroute 1
Subroute 2
Figure 8: Example of network decomposition.
AODV-EHA. Results show that although AODV-EHA has
the theoretical “lowest” transmission cost, there is no security
in it, while ETARP has the advantages in terms of energy
eiciency in transmission while it can still maintain the same
safety performance as LTB-AODV.
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